Democracy as form of governance is constantly under pressure from its environment, including its 'users'. Therefore it is also constantly changing, to follow the popular attitudes, ways of behavior by the public, academic research results and technological options in the society. Some changes are introduced deliberately by the political actors in our societies; others are just appearing, without any action by the contemporary political system.
The research society has taken up to follow these changes more closely during the last ten years . The view of s' democratic systems has changed into a picture of a vivid democracy that is -at least to some extent -responsive to the changes in our societies. This volume is showing and analyzing what is going on in Europe regarding democratic innovations.
We focus on institutionalized innovations in this volume, often based on examples already used in other countries. It is clear that diffusion of innovations, projects and good practices is the way how new models to act are introduced. It is also notable that many new democratic innovations are active at the local level of the society-the government level closest to the people.
We want to present a number of European cases with this volume, mostly based on empirical work on case studies, but also some experiments in the field of research.
The starting point for this volume was a workshop on democratic innovations at the ECPR Joint Sessions in Potsdam 2009. We have added to this base some additional articles, giving the book an in-depth view on all major innovations used today.
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Introduction
At first glance, the recall process -the process in which citizens can remove an elected official or body from office by popular vote -hardly seems innovative. First mentioned by Aristotle, 105 the recall has a history both intertwined with and as long as the citizen's initiative and legislative referendum, though used more sporadically. While the initiative and referendum give citizens the voice to decide major policy issues, the recall focuses not on the policies but the policy-maker, since it allows voters to directly assess the performance of elected politicians -or entire electoral bodies, in proportional systems -by subjecting them to the possibility of losing their mandate before their electoral term is over. The recall is institutionally diverse: it can be either full or mixed, depending on who initiates the referendum process, and take either the separate-elections or the recall-and-replacement formats. 106 Recalls also vary by 104 This chapter was made possi ble by the sup-port of the Czech Science roum:lation through grant no. 40310711608. 'The Politics of Lo~a l Referendums in Central
Europe' ' as we ti lls by grant no . VG20 I 02013029 a-1' the Czech Ministry of 1 ruerlor, "Reducing Security T hrems fro m Corruption and Organi zed Cdme in tbe Czec l1 Republic." 105 In the Constitution of Athens, Part 43 Aristotle explains that one ofthe duties of the Council of Five Hundred was to evaluate the performance of the "sovereign assembly." In that assembly "the people have to ratify the continuance of the magistrates in office. if they are perfo rming their dulles properl y, and ....
impeachments are introduced by those who wish w do so .. .''1l1is raLi fi,cation/imneachmenl process could be an ancie nt ver~illll or lhe modem recall.
106 A full reca ll takes place when c itizens are involved in both petitioning tbr ami thcr1 voti ng in the reca ll referendum.ln a mixed reca.ll. citizens are invo l.ved in cYnly one of the two processes, such as when they may vote in the recal l bot on the basis of a decision by P:;trli!l.ment ( ID'E.A 2008) . In the separate-elections format, a referendum on the recall of a politician or political body is he ld; iftbe recu ll is sucoes,sful. a teplacemen'l election is ther\ scheduled . In the reca ll-and-replacement forma t, tl1~ referendum and the replacement election U].ke tJlace at the same timt, in which the results of the replacemem e lection are vali.d tm ly if the incumbent is whether turnout quorums arc imposeu for the res ults to bt: valid. Overall, in the coumries where the recall process ts instiLutionaltzed, the device is genernlly seert a:, a m~dlani s m for democratic accCluntabi!ity between decl ions, particu. larly 1n (;ases where an elected politictan refuses to resign (or CRI111tll be impeached), but is accused of incompetence. bribery, ur other gross vio lations of moral conducL Relru.ively ·old' democratic devices as the recall can become Innovative when they are applied to new and uncxpecLed contexts. lhu5 serving as fresh solutions to problems like civ1c apathy 01 corrupt1on that are det!p-rooted and dil'ticult m prevent (G . Smith 2009) . While it is believed that the recall at the level of local politics is pr:lcticed most extensively in the U.S . stales (Cronin 1989) , over the last rwo decades the device has become increasingly used io two new democracies of post-communjst Europe !'he recal l process has remainetl on~:: of1he least rese;:~rched a reas of democratic politics. One reason is tluu the device is so sporadically used. particularly at the nmional level, which has made It difficult. to evaluate its impact. Altman (2005) points out that the 2004 referendum to rec<:~ll Venezuelan Prc6ident havcz trom oFfice nearly led the country to civtl wor (in pan due to alleged polttkal intcrJ~rence in both tl1e signature collection pmcess anu in Ute recall
successfully reca lled. One of' the 11111111 dllferenccs between tht: fomlats il> thaltn the reca ll-n nd-rcp lacement fbmll!l politicu l attention does Jlr)l locus only on lhe . polillc1u11 being recalled, but also gruvitmcs towanls campoigns <lf other caJ!didates Sl!ekillg polilTcalunice. !n both fonnaLS. tl reca lled politician could plau!:ibly nm as a candidutc in the repl.acemenl cleclion . vote). and cau t1ons that the recall's inJpact can vary considerably by institutional context. Arguably lhe reca ll event moslrcsearched by ~olitical sciemists is the successful reca ll of California Governor Gray Davis.
1 7 On the basis or that case, Shaw. McKen7.1e anJ Underwood (2005) -argued that the recall-andreplacement format disadvantages mcumbent parties, who have tl) hoth defend the incumbent wl.Ule also campaigni ng fur a party replacemel\'l. Others 'found that ethnic cleavages (Segura. and Fraga '200R) , strateg1c voung (Alvarez, Kiewiel and Sinclair 2006) , and corpOI':lte lobbying (Cressman 2007 ) played a mayor role 111 th_ e recall vote. Sim.:e those are a lso fcntures of ordinary elecwra l po litics. it is not surprising thal Bowler and Cam (2006: 8) perceived the California recal l as ''just another election'" in which the '·constitutionaL orderly. and peaceful replacement of one leader by ano ther" took place.
In terms of' local po litics, most research has focu~ed on the U.S .. where 3 states have legislation enabling recalls at the municipal level. Within an average five-year period, one in ten local governments experience an allemp L to reca ll an elected ol'ticial in those states (Bow ler and Cai n 2006). Cain. Anderson. and Eat()n (2Ul)6) tbund that campai~rns to recaU mayors organized by groups or citizens were more successful Lhan campaigns organiz.ed by instih.uionlll inte rests. They also f()unclthat mayors are more likely to be recalled in the recalland-replitcemen t format than in the separate-elections formaL Laslly. those authorS also claimed lhat the number of signatures re4uired for a pt:li tion does not have an impact on the success of a rc:~.:all proposal to get on the ballot. Other institutional detemunants do not seem to have an e"O'ect on the ability of citizens to recall state offic tals in differenr lJ.S. state~ (Mlxon 200()).
Since the empirical data on tbe reca ll process at tile local level is piecemeal and the literature is relatively sma ll , there has been little systematic attempt ltl evaluate the local recal l as a mechanism of democratic governance. This chapter takes a step i11 that direction by evalualing the recall process in the only two post-comrnuttisr cotUltries where national legislation enab les loca I residents to usc that uevice: Poland (s1nue 1992) and Slovnkia (since 2002). Building on the worb...of Lastic ( ) and Piasecki (2005 , the chapter wi ll first give an overview of\he basic clement5 of Polish and S lovak legislation on I 07 Accon.ling, to the omcto l petitiOn , the accusalion made against DI'IVI S was thnt he had engaged itl "gross mismanagement of C'a l ifornia tirrances hy overspending l.lLxpnyers' money. threatening public safety by culLing fu.11ds Lo locul govemmcnts. failin g 1u account lor the cxurbitanl cost of tl1e energy ftasc11, und Jailing m general to deal with the state's major problems until they geL to the crisis srage." 55% of Californian voters voted to recall Davis (rurnout was 61 direct democracy at the local level. We then evaluate the recall process in Poland and Slovakia in terms of four main criteria: 1) whether citizen participation in the process is effective; 2) whether it is inclusive; 3) whether the recall helps restore legitimacy to public office when politicians are perceived to abuse their power; and 4) the effectiveness of the recall process, i.e. whether the recall helps identify and achieve collective goals of the communities under consideration. The analysis in the chapter is based on two main data sources. First, comprehensive databases of recall events were created for both countries on the basis of data from statistical offices, media reports, and election results.
108 Those databases were used to identify overall trends in recall use in those countries. Second, 24 interviews with local politicians and activists involved in recall campaigns were conducted in six different communities (three in each country) in order to gain insight into participants' experience and evaluation of the recall process. The cases were selected on the basis of variation in recall outcome (whether successful or not), as well to achieve variation in the set of collective problems raised in those communities.
Legislation on Local Direct Democracy in Poland and Slovakia
Immediately after the collapse of communism, many countries in Central and Eastern Europe passed legislation on the local initiative and referendum, and to a lesser degree, the recall. Unified Germany is the best-known example of this. During the Cold War period Baden-WUrttemberg was the only German state to have local referendums (where there were roughly 300 cases since 1956), whereas all other German states passed similar legislation after German unification, most recently in Berlin. In Bavaria, there have been an eye-popping 1,457 initiatives just in the years 1995 (Walter-Rogg and Gabriel 2007 Poland and Slovakia are the only two countries in Europe where local recalls are legally permitted nationwide. Both countries use the separate-elections format and impose turnout quorums for the recall (but not in the re_ placement election) to be valid. The countries vary considerably in the use of the recall device (it is much less common in Slovakia), in part due to differences in lbeir legislative histories.
Polish regulations on local direct democracy have undergone several phases of legislative development. In the first phase of democratic reform, the Act on Local Self-government of March 1990 established that local referendums are one of two ways municipal self-administration is to be carried out (the other way is decision-making by local council), and diff'i::renliated between obligatory local referendums, such as in the introduction of local taxes, and facultative local referendums, in the case of other matters important for Lhe community. The Law on Local Referendums of October 1991 established the specific rules for carrying out local referendums in Poland. Initially, recall referendums were to be caUed if local residents coll ected signatures of 20% of registered voters and would be valid if 50% of the electorate voted. Since there are three types of municipality (gmina) in Poland -rural, urban, and urban-rural -recalls can take place in all three types. Two months after the law went into force, it was amended so that signatures of only 10% of registered voters were necessary, and outcomes were valid with a reduced 30% turnout quorum (Olejniczak-Szalowska 2002; Piasecki 2005) . In September 1995, the Law on Local Referendums was amended so that recalls can neither take place in the last six months of the electoral tenn nor in the first 12 months of an electoral term. It also clearly stated that only citizens can initiate a campaign to recall the local council. Also in 1995, the Highest Administrative Court ruled that recall referendums couldn't take place at the same time as local referendums on other municipal issues.
In the second phase of democratic refonn in Poland, which focused on political reform at the meso-level of government (Swianiewicz and Herbst 2002; Wollmann and Lankina 2003) , a new Law on Local Referendums was passed in September 2000 that enabled referendums at the county and regional level. Legislation on the direct electiorr of msyors was also part of the territorial reform package. The amended referendum law thus enabled the recall of mayors as of 2003, which can be initiated by either citizens or the loca l counci l. However, if a local council calls for a recall referendum of the mayor, and if there-call is not successful, then the local council has to be dissolved, which has led to practically no recalls of that type (Piasecki 2005) .
In the most recent phase of reform, in July 2005 another amendment of the referendum law was passed (taking effect at the time of the 2006 local elections) that abolished the 30% turnout quorum and stated that recall elections are valid, when turnout reaches 3/5 of the level of the turnout achieved in the prior election of the political entity being recalled. This means that if 5,000 voters voted in a mayoral election, the mayor can be recalled if in the recall referendum at least 3,000 voters tum out, the majority of whom vote in favour of recalling him. By tying the turnout quorum to a municipality's prior turnout record, the amendment has the potential to decouple referendum validity from demographic conditions, such as population size, that strongly shape aggregate turnout (M. Smith , 2011 . In other words, the amendment has the effect of generally reducing the turnout quorum for larger towns and cities (as well as possibly increasing it in smaller communities), so that the chances of achieving a successful recall election are more evenly distributed among municipalities of different size, all else being equal.
In summary, Polish legislation on the local recall has become increasingly expansive (from recalls of local councils, to recalls of councils, mayors, and elected officials of county and regional governments) as well as more favourable to those initiating a recall campaign (reductions in signature collection requirements as well as in turnout quorums) . As we will discuss in the following section, these legislative changes have had a positive impact on the effectiveness of citizen-initiated recall campaigns.
Slovakia, by contrast, has had a very weak legislative framework for all forms of local direct democracy. As discussed by Lastic (2005 Lastic ( , 2007 Lastic ( , 2011 , the clauses relating to local referendums and recalls in the main Law 369/1990 on Local Government were amended a spectacular 27 times between 1990 and 2005. As was the case with the frequent changes to the Slovak constitution in the 1990s, the amendments to the Local Government Act seem to have little or no justification in referendum practice (as the state administration does not collect data on local referendums and recalls, it can hardly evaluate them), but was rather the result of the calculus of political parties to steer legislative rules to their advantage. The reasons behind some legislative changes are more clear-cut than others; for example, in 1998, in reaction to the Sturovo referendum where the local government organized a referendum against Slovak NATO membership, the Slovak parliament passed legislation stating that local referendums can only be held on issues in the competency of local government, rather than on issues a local government finds important. In 2001, parliament also passed legislation instituting not only the direct election of mayors (Law No. 6/2001 on Local Government), but also their possible recall by local citizens. The law also established a separation of powers between the mayor and 204 the local council, and provided the mayor with extensive executive powers over local administration and in chairing meetings of the local council.
The same law also detailed regulations for the recall process. Paragraph 13a of the amendment states that the local council shall call a referendum on the recall of the mayor if 1) at least 30% of registered voters in the municipality demand it via a putition: or 2) the mayor engages in gross and repealed acts of negligence, if he breaks constitutional l_ aw. or if he is either absent or not dul y performing the of-fice of mayor for a period of 6 months . As in Po land, once the signatures are co llecled, the loca l council has to approve oy majority vote thai the legal conditions tbr a reca ll have been mel . 
Citizen Participation in the Local Recall: is it Effective?
If participatory innovations are to help bring about political change, citizen involvement in them has to be effective. Effective participation means that citizens' contributions in a participatory process are not simply dismissed or ignored, but are actuaiJy taken into account in deliberations and decision-making East em Europe, as well as in Germany and Switzerland, the institutions of direct democ racy an: not si mply consultative, but are legally bi11di11g on government. Tills means that if direct democracy campaigns are relatively accessible, i.e. easy to carry out, those campaigns would also represent an effective means for ordinary citizens to shape or change local government policy.
In fact, the effectiveness of binding direct democracy devices -e.g. the relative ease with which citizens can organize initiatives when governments are irre~;ponsive , or the ease w1th whkh legislmures can deter decision-making to citizens on timdamentally important topics and treaties -contributes to their immense popularity around the world. Asked whether referendum use was a good or bad thing, respondents in the Anglo-Saxon countries of Australia. New Zealantl, Canada and the U.S . states of California and Washington have given resounding popular approval (lr the device by margins of around 65% (good thing) to around 5% (bud thing\ (Bowler. Donovan, Carp :won [n a 1997 Eurobarometer survey. respondents across Lhe lS-EU states agreed. by a 71.5% to 28.5% margin. that the Swiss system of direct democracy works well and should be considered in theu· home coWltries. In the USA, no srate that has adopted institutions of direct dtlmocracy at the state level has ever gottfln rid o I" Lhem. and in fact snore and more states ate ad1>pti.og tbos~ tnstitutions for the Jirs1 t1me .
Turning; LO the recall process, effective participation depends on trade-oft's in two key institu(ional features: L) the rules according to which citizens can petition to remove a politician or polit!eal body from office, and 2) the turnout quorum in the reca ll vote. In terms of the petition, if the number of sig.nat ures needed for the petition were "too high, .. then there would he Jess frequent recall campaigns. though !.he campaigns that can meet high signature requirements likely have wide popular suppon among the electorate. U' the signature requirement is •·too IO'I· v."' then there would be more frequent recaU campaigns. though it would be conceivable !bat very sma ll groups of residents would be able to use the device to challenge and discredit popularly elected officials. Similarly. high turnout quorums would mean thar few recall votes woul d he successful, but it also lmplies tbal the recalls that do succeed have over· whelming support of the local pnpulaLion. By contrast. low turnout quorums (or fl(m-exislent quorums, as in the USA) imply that many recalls could be successful, but wilh 1he prospect that elected officials could be ousted from office by only a small fraction of the total electorate. Tukmg these tradl!-offs int.o ac~ coum, one could hypothesize that the reca ll process IS most effective when legislation strikes a balance between the benefits aml casts of high and low signnture requirements and quorums Such a balance helps -.:nsure that direct democracy institutions are not manipulated by very smn!l groups. buL 11t the same time ensures that civic groups that i_n.itiate campaigns with wide popular support have a good cha nce to succeed.
206
Anmher important consideration is that demograpluc conditions do infl Lhe degree of effective participation. If a signature requirement i~ set at' 10% 0 the electorate for all municipalities, then lt Woltld be much easier campaigners to col.lect those signatures in small villages compared to ci ties. Similady, if the rumout quorum were to be for example 50%. recaJ would be possible in the villages, but nearly impossible tO organize in ci since urban voters are often less likely to vote than rural ones, paniculatly in one-off recall event that is not ried to any other , election. fn fact, in Poland pr· to 2005 (when U1e recall quorum was setlo 3/5 of the turnout level achieved the prior election t1f the political enrity being recalled), there were no recalls in larger cities due to the 30% rurnout quorum , In J 992 in Krakow, local residents seeking to recall the cily council fo und it impossible to col the more than 54.000 signatures that would have been necessary to call Lhe erenuum (Piasecki 2005) . In 2000. at the time when Andrzej Lepper's Self-Defence Party arganized a national campaign lo block major roads to protes1 against the economic situation of Polish farmers, Self-Defence collaborated with merchants (i·om a local market in Jelenia Gora to organize a referendum· on the recal.l of the city council. Despire Lhe wide publicity of the campaign, only 14% of registered voters voted in the referendum, which once again underst.:ores the difficulty of organizing referendum campaiglls in urban eonte.x1s.
Beyond individual cases. we can use comprehensi vc data on the local recaU in Poland and Slovakia to beller understand citizens' chances of successfully recalling local councils and mayors. ln Poland, between 1992-2000, when it was poss"ible to recall only local councils (so-caLled rural , urban, and ruralurban gmina). there were 275 such recalls ( Figure I While im;titutional learning. combined with improved legislative condilions. likely contributed to· tbe increasing cftectivem.:ss of the recaU between electoral periods, successful recalls of local councils have never exceeded 16% ofthe rota I for any giveo electoral period.
!lowever, once il was possible for Polish cilizens to directly elecl and recall their mayors. lhe number of council reca lls declined significantly. with citizens turning their attention instead lo the mayors. ln recent e-lectoral periods. attempts at recalling mayors have been more frequent than council recalls as well as roughly twice as likely to lead to successful outcomes. \\!bile there have been fewer recalls in the 2007-2010 electorallenn (during which rime the 315 rurnour rule is in effect). 17.6% oflhose cases have resulted in valid recalls. The new rumout threshold does increase the chances of reaching valid results: recall rererendwns in Piwniczna-Zdr6j (turnout of 19.4%). Dorohusk (28.5%), L.gierz (26.0%). Zdwiska Wola (29. 1 %), all of which look place in 20~8, h~d binding outcomes under the cu.rrent legislation, bur would have been mval1d under the prior 30% quorum. The new quorum ruks also made it possible for the mayor of the city of Lodz, the third-largest city in Poland, to be recalled in early 20 I 0 even with a recall turnout of only 22%.
In summary, Figures I 0.1 and I 0.2 lead to the inference that more is not necessarily better: over successive electoral periods, the number of local recalls in Poland has declined, but the degree of effective participation -in the sense of successful recall campaigns -has increased. While we have pointed to the role of legislative conditions in facilitating this development, a number of other factors could play a role as well: the ability of campaigners to learn from the successes and failures of campaigns in other towns, the expansion of web blogs and other forums for residents to discuss local issues more effectively, or the professionalization of Polish civil society (Rose-Ackerman 2007; Domanski 2009 ). More research is needed, particularly by local scholars, to better understand the above trends.
In Slovakia, by contrast, neither the Slovak government nor other public institutions monitor or collect data on recall campaigns. Thus, the only way to count the number of cases is by conducting content analyses of Slovakia media sources over the given period, searching for any article using the word "recall" (odvolanie in Slovak). The present author did this using the national dailies SME, Pravda, Nov); cas, Slovak Spectator, and the Slovak Press Agency for the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . During that time, it was possible to identify at least 36 campaigns aimed at recalling Slovak mayors, 25 of which led to actual recall votes. Of those 25, at least 13 led to the successful recall of mayors.
110 This suggests that even though the overall frequency of recall campaigns in Slovakia is much lower than in Poland, the effectiveness of the device is in fact higher. The lower number of Slovak recall campaigns could be due to a number of factors. As discussed above, the recall device is newer (since 2003) and comes with a 50% turnout threshold, which likely deters many would-be activists. Further, while Slovakia has a seventh of the population of Poland, it has a larger number of local governments (there are 2,929 municipalities in Slovakia, compared to 2,479 in Poland). In other words, Slovak municipalities are smaller in both population and territorial size than Polish ones, leading their budgets to be considerably smaller as well, which could imply fewer bigmoney controversies or fewer cases of major financial mismanagement. As suggested above, the high entry costs (turnout thresholds) for Slovak recalls leads to fewer cases but also a higher rate of success when campaigns are credible.
Citizen Participation in the Local Recall: is it Inclusive?
As an aggregative voting procedure, the recall process is inherently inclusive in the sense that any citizen with the right to vote can participate in the recall process, including the organization of recall petitions. However, critics of direct democracy, including the recall, claim that direct democracy devices are exclusionary, particularly to minority groups, and thus harmful to democratic politics as such. Since a referendum vote is based on majority rule, it is believed that social groups in the numerical majority, such as whites in Western societies, will be able to dominate referendum outcomes in ways that harm the rights and interests of minorities. In the context of local recalls in Poland and Slovakia, does the empirical evidence suggest that the recall process is exclusionary, or on the contrary, is a source of citizen empowerment for minorities, the poor, and others who challenge the 'establishment' in local government?
The claim that direct democracy is harmful to minority rights is often based on examples like the well-known Proposition 13 in California, which reduced tax revenues of the state and disproportionately shifted the costs of public services on the poor, minorities, women and others who were forced to pay higher user fees (Schrag 1998) . Historically, initiatives have also been used to prohibit same-sex marriages, to prevent Japanese from owning land, and to deny affirmative action to women and ethnic minorities (Cronin 1989 ).
However, more systematic studies of the topic of minority rights have challenged whether, as a whole, whites or other majority groups dominate referendum outcomes. Focusing on California, Hajnal and Lauch (2001) identified 45 initiatives from 1978-2000 that were of crucial importance to Latino and other minority communities. Proposition 13 on limiting property taxes (passed), Proposition 10 on limiting rent control (failed), and Proposition 165 on limiting welfare benefits (failed) are all examples of initiatives for which 210 minority groups have affected interests. Tbe authors found that U1e probability that a member of a racial group would be on lhe "winning side'' of an initiative concerning issues that "minorities dee m important" was 59% for whites. 59%
for African-Americans, 52% for Latino:-and 59% fur Asian-Americans. That is, whites and minorities as a whole have a similar oppcJJtunity ro support or challenge initiatives that concern them, and to do SCI with compara.blc success.
The scholarly literature has thus found mixed results concerning the effects of direct democracy on minority rights. Another point of consideration is that direct democracy has its own 'checks-and-balances' in the form of judicial review by the courts. We should take note that Parliaments and other representative institutions have also banned same-sex marriage, passed discriminatory legislation, and imposed large tax burdens on the poor. Both representative and direct democracy are subject to the same constitutions and constitutional courts, and bot11 are equally subject to judicial review. Both forms of democratil: decision-making can lead to unj ust outcomes, and courts are responsible for pmtecting minority rights regardless of the form of decision-making originally used (Center tl1r Responsive Government 1992).
Focusing on the local recalls in Ce ntral Europe, tbe key quesrion to pose is what kind of impact the recall process has for national m inorities. panicularly the Roma, and other socially excluded communitie.s. Since Slovakia bas relatively large Roma and Hungarian minoriry pQptllations, we will use Slovak cases to begin to answer the question above. Further examples, particularly of ethnically mixed communities are discussed in the following two sections of the chapter.
First, we should reiterate that between 2002-2008, at least 25 referendums on the recall of mayors took place in Slovakia (that compares to 126 recall cases taking place in Poland over the same tim.e period). Reca ll attempts are most frequent in the rural areas of the Banskobystricky region , particularly in the district Rimavska Sobota, which has a large Hungarian population, and in the Kosicky region, which has a relatively dense network of Roma communities. Recalls are least common in larger cities and localities close to Bratislava. Many of the municipalities where recall s have taken place are located in areas of the country with higher degrees of social exclusion ( Gajdo~ 2005), rhus suffering from high unemployment, poor public infrastructure and transport accessibility, and low levels of education, human capilal, and population dtmsity (municipalities with less than 500 residents). One would expect that as mayors fail to sufficiently address (or are so 111ewhat powerless to address) the economic situation of their community, they may face recall attempts from disappointed citizens demanding greater change.
In Slovakia, recall attempts are particularly common in ethnically divided communities i.e. those with large Roma or Hungarian populations, which also tend to be in areas with high levels of social exclusion. One of the most wellknown cases concerning Roma took place in 2003 in the village of Richnava, where the population is estimated to be 60% Roma, where Roma unemployment is nearly 100% and where there is not even reliable water or electricity connections. The non-profit Roma Council of Slovakia (Rada Romit Slovenska) initiated a petition to recall the mayor for his lack of ability to address the plight of Roma residents. In the January 2004 recall vote, 600 of the I ,090 registered voters turned out, 510 (85%) of whom voted to successfully recall the mayor. While the mayor initially refused to accept the results of the referendum, he had little choice but to do so, after a criminal investigation on him was initiated for his refusal to leave office. 9 That case emphasizes the role that the legal system plays in enforcing referendum results when they are valid and rejecting them if they are unconstitutional or infringe upon civil rights.
By contrast, in the village of Zehra, which like Richnava has a large Roma community and a history of poverty and ethnic tensions, 111 the 2004 recall was not initiated by an NGO or local residents, but by the local council, which criticized the mayor for not disclosing enough information about the financial condition of the municipality.
112 Despite the problems the council voiced, only 262 of 756 registered voters turned out to vote in the recall.
113 Since recalls initiated by local councils do not involve civic campaigns, it is difficult for local residents to gain sufficient information about them. In similar referendums on the recall of the mayor initiated by local councils, such as in the municipalities of Pohorela in 2004 or Marianka in 2005, not a single one has been successful in reaching the 50% turnout threshold for binding outcomes.
While these cases are only reflective of the Slovak experience with the recall, they do suggest that it would be incorrect to automatically assume that the recall process is detrimental to minorities. In the cases above, Roma communities used the recall process as a tool to empower them vis-a-vis local governments that were not responsive to their needs. There is no evidence that the recall has been used to further exclude already marginalized minority groups from local politics. While the recall device is not always effective in bringing about a change in municipal leadership, it can be an important mechanism for minority groups themselves to demand that local government reflects the needs of all of its constituents.
Ill SME, "V Zehre po hromadnej bitke vladne napatie a obavy," 26. 
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Democratic Legitimacy: Using the Recall to Restore the Sanctity of Public Office
Recall campaigns often occur in contexts where residents believe that local government has suffered a major decline in its perceived legitimacy, such as through various scandals and perceived abuses of public office. Since it is often the case that there is insufficient evidence to convict a politician for malfeasance or corrupt behavior, the recall process provides a legally recognized and legitimate way for residents to decide themselves, whether the mandates of elected officials continue to hold the public trust. To illustrate the role of the recall in restoring public legitimacy, we will use two in-depth cases that gained nationwide attention in their respective countries: Piwniczna-Zdr6j in Poland, and Vel'ky Meder in Slovakia.
Piwniczna-Zdr6j (pop. I 0,500) is a Polish mountain spa town near the Slovak border, famous for its mineral water and skiing. While the town was a major ski center in the past, the lack of modern tourist infrastructure and outdated lifts has made it less competitive to more modern ski resorts in southern Poland. The development of a new, modern ski resort on Kicarz mountain close to the town center was one of the main themes of the November 2006 municipal elections. By promising to develop the Kicarz ski area and on the basis of her former status as Vice-President for Social Security (ZUS), Joanna Lesniak won the mayoral election by defeating the incumbent mayor, Edward Bogaczyk, in the second round by a 59% to 41% margin.
Half a year after the elections, however, news broke out that Lesniak was being indicted for criminal charges relating to real estate purchases approved by her in 1998 as Vice-President of Social Security. The prices for those purchases were allegedly overestimated by several million of Polish zlotys.
114 Two years later, the state attorney investigated Lesniak for lack of public supervision. While the case had been in a district court in L6dz, she did not disclose the issue to Piwniczna-Zdr6j residents prior to the 2006 mayoral elections, later insisting that she was innocent of any wrongdoing. Once the news of the criminal investigation broke out, local residents initiated a campaign to recall her from office. The main initiator of the campaign proclaimed that "we have been deceived. Never in our lives would we have supported Lesniak if we had known that she is charged with a crime."
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In addition to the political scandal, the development of the Kicarz ski area was also in doubt. The previous mayor of the city signed a contract with a de-I 14 Gazeta Wyborcza Krakow, "Referendum z Kicarzem w tie," 22.5.2008 , 115 Gazeta Wyborcza Krakow, "Referendum z Kicarzem w tie," 22 .5.2008. veloper to provide land for the future Kicarz ski area, which also gained the relevant building permits. After the elections, however, that contract was annulled by the local council at the initiative of the new mayor, citing, for example, the need for additional expert assessments about the possibility of landslides and the risks posed to the mineral water under the mountain. According to an interview with one of the campaigners in the recall, the mayor wanted to support another ski resort instead, which would have been further away from the city, and thus less beneficial to it. The mayor was thus in a battle between two competing ski area developments, with many local residents supportive of the Kicarz area that the mayor originally promised.
The campaigners for the recall of the mayor succeeded to collect 1 ,734 signatures, more than twice the 790 signatures, or 1 0% of registered voters, that was required by law. One of the people involved in the campaign explained the situation this way: Taking place on May 18, 2008, the recall referendum was successful, with 29.4% ofregistered voters turning out, the great majority of whom voted in favor of the recall. Regardless of whether the mayor was found guilty or not in the court case against her (she was later acquitted), voters in the recall felt that she deceived them both in the lack of disclosure as well as in going against an electoral promise (the ski resort issue). In the Polish context, the recall device was arguably the only effective mechanism available for residents to restore order to city hall.
Similarly, the case of Vel'ky Meder in Slovakia can be used to illustrate some of the benefits and limits of the recall process as a tool for dealing with public officials accused of corruption. Vel'ky Meder lies between Dunajska Streda and Komarno, approximately eight miles from the Hungarian border in western Slovakia. Ethnic Hungarians constitute 85% of the population of 9, 113, Slovaks 14%. The city is well known as a tourist destination for its large Thermalpark, which the city developed for about 77 million crowns (about 1.8
million euros) between 2001and 2003.
116 Tourism is in fact the core of the city's economy, employing nearly 1,000 people in a city with an unemployment rate close to 30%.
Given the success of the Thermalpark, the city council wanted to expand its accommodation capacity and agreed to rent a large property next to the thermal bath to a businessperson for a symbolic 1 crown for 50 years, in exchange that the businessperson would develop year-round accommodations for visitors. According to one media report, the developer did not keep the agreement, as he built only a small complex ill-suited for winter use, and never submitted his investment plans to the local council.
117 As a result, the city council declared that it intended to cancel the rental agreement with the developer.
According to numerous media accounts of the events, the developer then visited the mayor, Samuel Lojkovic, who "allegedly promised to the renter that everything can be resolved and promised him that he will try to convince the city council to not cancel the contract. In exchange, the mayor requested from the developer the transfer of some properties to his name. In the end, the mayor demanded cash."
118 The developer then reported the bribe to the Office of the Fight against Corruption, which then organized a police raid. Acting as an agent provocateur, which is possible under Slovak law, the developer met the mayor at a restaurant, where the mayor allegedly accepted a bribe of 300,000 crowns (about 7800 euros). The police arrested the mayor on the spot.
Since the mayor was soon indicted on charges of accepting a bribe, it was fitting that he should no longer function as mayor of the city. The city council therefore voted to call a referendum on the recall of the mayor, which was held in November 2005. Well before the recall took place, in January 2005, the Special Court dealing with corruption-related cases reached the verdict that the mayor was guilty of accepting the bribe and sentenced him to 32 months in prison. The mayor appealed the verdict, insisting that the money was not a bribe but rather the payment of a loan that the developer owed him. The recall thus took place in the context of an appealed criminal offence.
In November, 86% of voters voted in favor of recalling the mayor. However, only 13% ofthe 7,316 registered voters turned out, which meant that the result was non-binding. It may have been the case that residents thought the recall was pointless, since local elections were set to take place a month later. Turnout could have been low also because the recall was based on the initiative of the local council, which usually has less publicity than initiatives based on a citizens' petition. However, in the Slovak local council and mayoral elections of December 2006, Lojkovic was surprisingly re-elected as mayor, receiving a plurality 37% of the vote. He did not serve much of that term, since in February 2007, the High Court confirmed the guilty verdict, thus sending him to 32 months in jail and annulling his mayoral mandate.
The cases of Piwniczna-Zdr6j and Vel'ky Meder raise several important issues regarding the potential of the recall process as a tool for restoring legitimacy to public office. First, legitimacy is very much perceived: what matter is whether local residents perceive an abuse of power, not how it is decided in courts. Ironically, in Piwniczna-Zdr6j, the recalled mayor was later found to be aquitted of any wrongdoing concerning the property sales, whereas the mayor of Vel'ky Meder survived the recall vote (even securing re-election) despite being convicted of bribery.
Both cases involved controversies relating to major developments that were of vital interest to the local tourist economy, and both cases involved relatively blatant violations of public trust. Both towns are of similar size, and both are located in marginalized border areas. Despite these similarities, the opposite outcomes of the two recalls could have been due to different institutional features. The recall campaign in Piwniczna-Zdr6j was organized by a local entrepreneur and seemed to have received substantial publicity; the recall in Vel'ky Meder was decided by the local council without prior initiative of local residents . In terms of the turnout quorum, while the recall in Piwniczna-Zdr6j was valid under Polish law, it would have been invalid under the 50% quorum rule required for Vel'ky Meder and other Slovak municipalities. The recall in Piwniczna-Zdr6j took place in the middle of the electoral term, whereas in Vel'ky Meder it took place just before the mayoral election, which could have influenced turnout. The mayor of Vel'ky Meder also could have lost the subsequent mayoral election had Slovak law required an absolute majority via a second run-off election, as is the case in Polish mayoral contests.
The two contrasting cases illustrate the importance of the recall process when local government faces a crisis of legitimacy. But since legitimacy is itself perceived, residents may not always vote in ways consistent with court rulings, established facts, or other judgments from the outside. Differing institutional contexts can also shape residents' behavior in the recall process. This does not mean that the recall is not a useful tool for restoring public legitimacy, but it does suggest that recall outcomes and whether public legitimacy is indeed in crisis depend very much on local conditions and context.
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Effectiveness: Using the Recall to Achieve Policies in the Public Good
Another important tool for evaluating partiCipatory institutions is their effectiveness in achieving policies that are seen as reflecting the common good. Though the recall process involves decision-making about an elected official rather than a public policy, controversies about public policies are often in the background (and motivate) recall campaigns. The recall process can be an effective tool for decision-making by helping resolve policy debates in a sharply divided community by holding a 'referendum' on the official most responsible for the policy; it can also be used to oust officials from power who seem to pursue special interests as opposed to collective goals. To illustrate the role of the recall in helping achieve effective policies (or reversing ill-suited ones), we will focus on two case studies, one from the small Slovak village of Cakany, the other from the Polish city ofLopuszno.
Cakany is a small village with only 555 residents in the Trnava region of south-central Slovakia. As with many other Slovak recall cases, the village has a majority ethnic Hungarian population. Ethnic cleavages, however, seemed to have played a minor role in the case, since the main actors involved were all ethnic Hungarian. In the 2006 municipal elections, the incumbent mayor of Cakany. Dezider Kiss (independent), won the election over his closest rival, Livia Bugarova (a lso independent), by a slim 127 to 125 margin. The village was under-developed in ways typical for its area, i.e. Jacked natural gas, sewage. and a self-sustaining economic base.
The recall c:m1paign in Cak.any ha s its roots in a controversy surrounding the openJng of a gravel quarry in the municipality. In March 2005, the local council voted in favor of a 5 beclare quarry. intended to spur local jobs. The investor stated that. "water gravel mining will take place for a period of about 17 years and will lead 10 Lhe creation of two new 5 hectare bodies of water."
2006 in which about 100 local citizens attended, the mayor was not able to explain the change in the size of Lhe quarry. The project was also criticized by local re-Sidents beca use the quarry would probably employ on ly 7 people and wou ld not pmvide other benertts to the local government (such as the possibility of profit-sha n ng). Of course. the quarry would also have significant environmental impacts. such as in terms of transport by large trucks, and risks associated with water COlltamination. Because the controversy was still not widely known by the December 2006 local elections, the mayor was re-elected, though narrowly, to his fourth consecutive term in office.
In in Lopusz:no it was lhe future of local schools. In rural Polish communities the cost nf managing preschools. primary and ]()wer secondary schools often reach half or the budget of a municipality. which is responsib le for running them .
Wbile prescbool ed ucation is financed tbrough a muJticipality's own revenues.
primary and lower secondary etlm.:ation are fi nanced from a general-purpose grant, cal led an education subvention. from the central govemment. 111 The amount of the subvention is based on the weighted number of students in the municipality. However, Swianiewicz and Herbst (2002) found that municipalities' expenditure on education exceeded the received subvention by 20%, 218 meaning that local govemments were subsidizing schools. Per-student costs in rural communities are 30% higher than in cities because of the small size of schools and classes, which increase the share of fixed costs in total expenditures (an average primary school in a rural community has only 148 students, compared to 540 in cities). When coupled with rural communities' much lower own per capita revenues, these costs create an unsustainable situation for municipal finances and can lead to lower quality of educational instruction (ibid). For many municipalities, the only way out of the problem is to close down schools with too few students and to consolidate schools so that the number of pupils per school and classroom are higher. The problem of the efficiency of public schools was particularly ominous in Lopuszno, which has seen its enrollment in basic schools decline from 1,344 in 1998 to 717 in 2007. 123 The municipality ofLopuszno also encompasses 30 different rural settlements, some of which had their own basic schools. After the November 2006 municipal elections, the mayor and local council of Lopuszno agreed to close down four small rural schools, including a grammar school (Gimnazjum). The 126 pupils of that school were to join the 593 pupils attending another grammar school just several hundred meters away. 124
According to one local politician interviewed, school closures were necessary because of population decline and projected declines in enrolment, dropping from 1 ,200 pupils in 2007 in both the basic schools and gymnasia to about 860 pupils in 2012. In his view, "the closed-down schools have been defended but, in most cases, their students are now going to well-equipped and nice schoolswho are brought there by school buses with drivers and assistants -and do not want to go back to those old, neglected, and under-equipped schools. For sure, children from Snochovice [a settlement in Lopuszno where a school was closed] would not like that." However, in addition to those school closings, in February 2008 the local council also agreed to close down 5 additional basic schools in rural settlements, affecting over 200 pupils. 125 Those school closures, in addition to the four previously announced, would leave only one grammar school and two large basic schools left in the municipality. According to one interviewee, the smaller number of schools would also enable the municipality to cope in spite of the lower subvention levels that it expects to receive in future years. That decision led to public outrage. AI the loca l council meeting in February 2008 where the schoo l closures were armounced, A pol ice oflicer had to maintain order due to the angry commentll by roughly I 00 parents and teachers present at the meeting.
116 While the mayor claimed that the municipa !jty wasted 12 million PLZ in adrutiona J funding to those schools over the yew·s, parents complained that the mayor thinks only about economics and nm th e quality of education or about how early children need to get up to go to school. To one participant, "how can we be so heartless? A school is the heart of the village, the most important place. We are making a kilometre of road instead of this?" referring to the mayor's priority of investing more funds in road infrastructure rather than education. Another resident joined that assessment, asking "The well-being of children does not count? A hole in the road is more important than children?" (ibid).
To prevent the school dosure~, local residents organized a recall cam- 
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The cases of Cakany and Lopuszno, while different in many respects, suggest that the recall process can be a useful tool for reversing local policies that blatantly go against public interests. In Cakany, the politician who supported the expansion of the quarry, but without apparently first consulting the local council or residents, was recalled by an overwhelming majority. The new political leadership, which was critical of the quarry plans, was thus able to act quickly to have the relevant contracts and decisions annulled. In the absence of the recall process, the local community would not have had any other way to effectively bring about policy change. While the majority of Cakany residents believed that the quarry expansion was not in the public interest, the same can not be said of the school closures in Lopuszno. In that case, the community was likely divided, with reasonable arguments on both side of the debate. While many residents clearly opposed the school closures, it cannot be said that the mayor and local council engaged in gross negligence or mismanagement. They rather based decisions on declining enrollment trends, rising education costs, and too few students per class. The mayor and local council has a different, perhaps equally merited, vision of the public good as did the teachers and parents. Given the complexity of the issue and that the 'public good' was less clear cut, it is not surprising that the recall vote did not achieve sufficient turnout. In that sense, reasonable turnout quorums can play a major role in annulling recall votes that garner less public interest, while also enabling the recall to remain an effective tool for reversing policies going against quite blatant cases of the public good.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the recall process as a democratic innovation that has been enshrined in legislation in two new post-communist democracies, Poland and Slovakia. The chapter sought to overview and evaluate the use of the recall at the local level by examining four key criteria that democratic innovations typically try to achieve: effective participation, inclusive participation, democratic legitimacy, and effective decision-making.
Compared to other participatory devices that are consultative in nature, the recall process can be a powerful tool for effective participation precisely due to its binding outcomes. In the context of the recall, effectiveness can also refer to the likelihood with which citizens can successfully initiate and carry out a recall campaign. That likelihood is very much conditioned by the signature gathering conditions as well as the turnout quorum. While high quorums lead to less effective participation, this should not imply that it would be ideal to have no quorums at all, since quorums can also prevent recalls from being successful if backed by only a small segment of the local population. Quorum design is also an important consideration, since fixed quorum levels (as in Slovakia) can disadvantage cities, while relative quorum levels (as in Poland) seem to provide a more level playing field for all types of local government. n is oflerl believed that direct democracy can lead ltl exclusionary p~llilics.
due to perceived Jack of safeguards ensuring minority rights. This c hapter has argued that sucb pt:-rcept'ions are oot of place, because citizens enjoy rhe same constitutional protections regard less of the form or political dccision-maldng used. Fun her. in the CC!untries considered, I here is liLlie evidem;e that the recall process has been used to infringe upon minority rights or interests. Quite on the contrary, the chapter has found that recall use is quite common in Slovak cornmunities that are poor. marginalized and have large minority populations, who often ma, ke use of the recall themselves. In sucl] communities. politics can be very personal and problems difficu lt to solve. Wbile the recall process is hard ly the solution to a'IJ of ·a c:ommumty 's iUs. it can be an important mol for inclw;jve participation by providing aJi addi rio'lml mc~:hanism lor differem segments of society to articulate their interests.
The recall process furthers democratic legitimacy io two ways. Firsr. because the recall i5 legis!ati vely en.<: hrined. it is itself a legitimate mechanis1t1 in bringing about poJjtical change. Jn any of the interviews conducted. no respondenr questioned the legitimacy of the recall process as a fair and appropriate mec hanism of decision-making. Second. the recall process can also help lO restore legitimacy to publ ic office in the face of g ross violations of moral condueL, such as those evidenced in lhe Piwniczna-Zdr6j and Vel'ky Meder cases. Tue outc-ome of' those recalls reminds us thai legitirnacy is always perceived. and recall ou tcomes can be substamiall y conditioned by institurional conditions. Even iftherecall can have a positive imJ>acl o n the public legitimacy of elected officials. 1l cannot be considered a n objective anti-corruption device in its own right.
Lastly. U1e recall can serve to funber effective decision-making hy britlgmg erected officials to account who pursue policies st rongly against public Ill· lerests, as was indicated in the Cakany case. However, in less extreme situations. as was the case In Lopuszno. visions of the public good often depend on one's social position and perceptions of loca l interests. While there were many other djflcrences between the cases, and it is thus difficult to iofer mucb about them, it seems to be the case that the recall is most effective in helping resolve extreme and highly divisive situations in a transparent, inclusive and legitimate manner.
Introduction
One of the themes of this book, the flaws of modem liberal democracy, is a topi-c Lhal has been approached. from very different angles. On a lheoretical level. scholars representing difterenl discipEnes show great interest in discussing t.hese prob lems and how they could be mi nimized.. Technologica I innovations (e.g. Barber 2003; .Rhe:ingold 1993; Noveck 2009) are often brought up as one possible solution for strengthening liberal democracy. There is a long !tistory ol' launching tecllnological remedies for imperfections in prevailing sode-L les. The inf'l uence of innovations such as radio and television t)n po litical systems is hard to exaggerate. They have created additional ways oflinking politicians to their voters, and could increase both the amount of politically relevant information available and the extent of accountability.
Jt is common to argue that in many ways the most r~cent technological dtange is the most paradigmatic one, especial ly because of its potential to be wclusive and far-reac hi11g. As Caste li s (200 I. p.2) puts it~ 'The Internet is a commun ication med ium that allows, tor the first lime. the communication of many to many, in chosen time, on a global scale.' In just a few decades, information and communication technologies (ICTs) have dramatically changed the conditions lor society in genera l and its polit.ical aspec1s. too. New concepts have been created using the prefix e, meamng electronic. and by combining this with po l 1tic~1l keywords such as democracy. participation a.nd government additional applications of po litica l processes as well ns new fields of research have been created. f-rom a political perSJJective. tl1e introduction orTCTs has resu lted in many ne'>v questions and concepts. What will tlw Juture effects be or a liberal democracy that ls embedded in a new technological landscape? How docs this technology affect politica l processes or the administration of the political systems? Can e-democracy be regarded as a democratic innovation? This chopter specilically rae uses on whanhe qualities or e-dernocracy could consist or and how these LJUal ities could affec t the political dimensio n of society. To examine this is:;ue, e-democracy will be srudied from a broad lheoretical perspective, :l ithough the empirical context will be Swedish Lhro ughout. It is possible to understand the character of e-democracy by studying how Swedish municipalities work with it. In addition, analyzing material from a Swedish survey about the population's internet habits makes it possible to study variation in individuals'
